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Abstract. An important aspect of security requirements is the understanding 
and listing of the possible threats to the system. Only then can we decide what 
specific defense mechanisms to use. We show here an approach to list all 
threats by considering each action in each use case and analyzing how it can 
be subverted by an internal or external attacker. From this list we can deduce 
what policies are necessary to prevent or mitigate the threats.  These policies 
can then be used as guidelines for design. The proposed method can include 
formal design notations for validation and verification. 
1   Introduction 
Defining security requirements is difficult and there is no generally accepted way 
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. An important aspect of security requirements is the listing of the 
possible threats to the system. Only then can we decide what specific defense 
mechanisms to use. A threat is a potential attack, while an attack is an actual misuse 
of information. Most approaches consider only the effect of low-level attacks; e.g., 
taking control of the database system through a buffer overflow attack. There are two 
problems with this approach: the number of such threats is very high, and we need to 
make assumptions about a system that has not yet been built. A way to avoid the first 
problem is the use of sets of generic attacks [6], but this approach cannot avoid the 
second drawback. 
We believe that we should look at the higher levels of the system. An attacker 
has an objective or goal that he wants to accomplish, e.g., steal the identity of a 
customer, transfer money to his own account, etc. Security requirements should 
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define the needs of the system without committing to specific mechanisms. We show 
here an approach to list threats by considering each action in each use case and 
seeing how it can be subverted by an internal or external attacker. We assume that 
the functional use cases have already been defined or are being defined concurrently. 
From the list of threats we can deduce what policies are necessary to prevent or 
mitigate the attacks. The proposed method is extendable to include formal design 
notations for validation and verification; we explore some possibilities. While there 
is no guarantee that our approach produces all possible threats, it appears superior to 
other approaches with similar objectives.  
A related approach is the concept of misuse cases [1], [7]. Misuse cases are 
independent use cases initiated by external attackers to the system. That approach, by 
itself, lacks completeness because it is not clear what misuse cases should be 
considered. Another related approach is risk analysis. In risk analysis, threats to the 
successful completion and use of the system are identified and analyzed. Threat 
likelihood and consequences are considered in a cost benefit analysis, and plans are 
made to address them. Risk analysis, per se, lacks a method of systematically 
identifying the threats, it concentrates on the effect of threats on the system. 
In previous work we introduced a methodology for secure systems design that 
uses architectural layers and security patterns [8], [9]. An important aspect of that 
methodology is the emphasis on approaching security at all stages. The approach 
presented here would be one of the first stages in using that methodology.  
Section 2 discusses some background on use cases. Section 3 presents the 
concept of misuse actions and shows through an example of how to relate threats to 
use cases. Section 4 shows how we can define policies to prevent the identified 
attacks. Section 5 compares our approach to other approaches. The paper ends with 
some conclusions.  
2 Use cases, threats, and policies 
Use cases are interactions of a user with the system [10]. The set of all use cases is 
described by a UML Use Case diagram. Each use case is described by a textual 
template identifying actors (or stakeholders), preconditions, postconditions, normal 
flow of execution, and alternate flows of execution. Sequence diagrams may 
complement the textual descriptions. Use cases are not atomic but consist of a 
sequence of actions. For example, in a use case to borrow a book from the library 
one must check if the user has a valid account (first action), she is not overdue 
(second action), the copy of the book is set to not available (third action), etc. 
Complex use cases may have many actions. Since use cases identify the actor that 
performs the use case, we can also identify who is the possible attacker. 
As indicated earlier, an attacker has an objective or goal that he wants to 
accomplish. To accomplish his purposes, he must interact with the system trying to 
subvert one or more actions in a use case (he might do this indirectly). Low level 
actions, such as attacking a system through a buffer overflow, are just ways to 
accomplish these goals but not goals in themselves. Looking at use cases is 
consistent with the idea that security must be defined at the highest system levels, a 
basic principle for secure systems [11]. 
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There is a large variety of possible security policies and it is not clear in general, 
which ones are needed in a given system. Once we understand the possible threats, 
we can define policies to stop them. These policies are used in turn to guide the 
selection and implementation of security mechanisms; for example where in the 
system we should use authentication and the type of authentication required. If the 
threats indicate that we require authorization we can then find the specific 
authorization rules that are needed. In an earlier paper we proposed a way to find all 
the rights needed by the actors of a set of use cases in an application [12]. The idea is 
that all the use cases of an application define all the possible interactions of actors 
with the application. We need to provide these actors with rights to perform their 
functions. If we give these actors only those rights, we are applying the basic 
principle of least privilege. If we define appropriate rights, attacks can be prevented 
or mitigated.  
3 Threats and actions 
We illustrate our approach through an example. Consider a financial company that 
provides investment services to its customers. Customers can open and close 
accounts in person or through the Internet. Customers who hold accounts can send 
orders to the company for buying or selling commodities (stocks, bonds, real estate, 
art, etc.). Each customer account is in the charge of a custodian (a broker), who 
carries out the orders of the customers. Customers send orders to their brokers by 
email or by phone. A government auditor visits periodically to check for application 
of laws and regulations. Figure 1 shows the Use Case diagram for this institution. 
Figure 2 shows the activity diagram for the use case “Open account” in this 
institution, indicating the typical actions required to open an account for a new 
customer. We indicate “swimlanes” for Customer and Manager, the two actors 
involved in this use case [13].  These actions result in new information, including 
objects for the new customer, her account, and her card-based authorization. 
Potentially each action (activity) is susceptible to attack, although not necessarily 
through the computer system. Figure 3 shows the same activity diagram showing 
possible threats and including a new swimlane for an external attacker.  For this use 
case we could have the following threats: 
• A1. The customer is an impostor and opens an account in the name of another 
person 
• A2. The customer provides false information and opens an spurious account 
• A3. The manager is an impostor and collects data illegally 
• A4. The manager collects customer information to  use illegally 
• A5. The manager creates a spurious account with the customer’s information 
• A6. The manager creates a spurious authorization card to access the account 
• A7. An attacker tries to prevent the customers to access their accounts (denial 
of service) 
• A8. An attacker tries to move money from an account to her own account 
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Fig. 1.  Use cases for a financial institution 
In the activity diagram in Figure 3 the attacks are shown as misuse actions 
(dotted lines). Undesired consequences in the form of additional or alternative 
objects (dotted lines) have also been added.  With these annotations, the attacks and 
vulnerabilities presented by the use case become part of our understanding of the use 
case and are explicit in its analysis.  
Note that: 
• We can identify internal and external attackers. The actors in these attacks could 
be external attackers (hackers), acting as such or hackers impersonating legitimate 
roles. It is also possible that a person in a legitimate role can be malicious 
(internal attacks). For example, A1 and A3 are performed by external attackers; 
A2, A4, A5 and A6 are performed by insiders, while A7 and A8 are performed by 
either external or internal attackers. 
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Fig. 2.  Activity diagram for use case “Open account” 
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Fig. 3.  Activity diagram for use case “Open account” showing misuse actions 
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• We can list systematically all (or most) possible application threats. While 
completeness cannot be assured, the fact that we consider all actions in a use case 
gives us some confidence that we considered at least all important possible 
attacks. The threats that we postulate come from our experience, from the 
knowledge of the application, and from the study of similar systems (banking 
systems have similar threats).  
• We can later identify the target of the low-level attacks. Starting from the threats 
to actions we can look at the lower levels of the systems already designed and 
search for possible realizations of the threats, e.g. a buffer overflow, bypassing 
entry points of a procedure, etc. 
• Note that we only consider attacks to our system. Attacks to systems that 
collaborate with our system are beyond our control. For example, credit checking 
is normally performed using an external service. If that service was compromised 
we could receive erroneous information about a potential customer and make a 
wrong decision about his account. 
• We are not restricted to analyze each use case in isolation. Some workflows 
require several use cases, e.g. “Approve a purchase order” can be followed by 
“Send a purchase order”. We can consider attacks that take advantages of this 
sequence, for example, by bypassing some steps that perform checks. These 
threats, in general, are harder to find. 
• The sequence used in the example to open an account in a financial institution is 
very similar to opening an account in a bank, in a club, or in a library. In fact, we 
can think of it as a pattern and it could be an addition to a pattern for building the 
corresponding software [14]. Having threat patterns simplifies finding threats for 
new systems.  
4 Stopping or mitigating the attacks 
We can now find out what policies are needed to stop these attacks. For this purpose, 
we can select from the typical policies used in secure systems [11].  This selection 
should result in a minimum set of mechanisms instead of mechanisms piled up 
because they might be useful. For example, to avoid impostors we can have a policy 
of I&A (Identification and Authentication) for every actor participating in a use case.  
To stop or mitigate the attacks in the example we need the following policies: 
• A1. A3. Mutual authentication. Every interaction across system nodes is 
authenticated. 
• A2. Verify source of information. 
• A4. Logging. Since the manager is using his legitimate rights we can only log his 
actions for auditing at a later time. 
• A5. A6. Separation of administration from use of data. For example, a manager 
can create accounts but should have no rights to withdraw or deposit money in 
the account.   
• A7. Protection against denial of service. We need some redundancy in the system 
to increase its availability. Intrusion detection and filtering policies should also be 
useful. 
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• A8. Authorization. If the user is not explicitly authorized he should not be able to 
move money from any account.  
The lower levels of the system should enforce these policies. If they are properly 
designed we do not need to identify every low-level threat.  
5 Formalization 
The analysis of attacks and their prevention can be formalized as shown in Figure 4. 
The preconditions for undesired consequences are presented in comments. For the 
analysis we focus only on sufficient preconditions that should not normally be 
present at that point in the execution of the use case. In some cases the preconditions 
are simple conjunctions, where all conditions must be present.  In other cases, the 
preconditions may involve more complicated logical relationships among 
preconditions.  
To express relationships among preconditions, we have adopted the concise 
notation from RSML [15]. Preconditions are represented in tabular form as 
disjunctions of conjunctions (disjunctive normal form). Each column in the table is a 
sufficient set of preconditions. Within each column, the role of a precondition literal 
(True, False, or don’t care) is given by the letters T, F, or X.  For example, a spurious 
account could be created either when a malicious manager acts without customer 
approval, or when there is an error (intended or unintended) in the customer 
information. 
Figure 5 shows the equivalent fault tree representation for one set of 
preconditions. A fault tree analysis allows probabilities of occurrence to be estimated 
for each condition or event. The fault tree can be expanded, with sub-dependencies, 
to assist in this process. In a fault tree a circle or ellipse represents a basic condition, 
while a diamond represents a condition that could be further elaborated. An error in 
the customer info is treated as basic – it doesn’t matter how or why the error was 
made. Customer approval could be further expanded, for example to show an “or” 
condition between customer signing an acknowledgement or customer receiving 
notification. Similarly, alternative preconditions for a malicious person acting in the 
role of manager could be explored.  
In analyzing risks and their prevention, it is important to make a distinction 
between the actual desired condition, and the mechanism that is used to achieve it. 
For example, a good manager is a desired condition for secure transactions. 
Authorization is a mechanism to reduce the likelihood of a bad manager being able 
to accomplish his purposes. But authorization is, itself, not the desired goal, and 
may, in fact, be neither sufficient nor the only means of achieving the goal condition. 
In this sense, our analysis approach is consistent with the spirit of goal oriented 
practices [2, 16].  
In the formalized analysis, the defense policies and mechanisms must be shown 
to reduce the probability of each sufficient set of preconditions to an acceptable level 
of risk. An actual formal analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, 
we can give a sense of how such analyses could be performed using fault tree and 
model checking techniques. 
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Fig. 4. Formalizing the analysis of attacks and preventions 
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Fig. 5.  Fault tree for spurious account creation 
 
Fault tree analysis can assess the effectiveness of chosen defense mechanisms for 
achieving desired levels of assurance. Fault tree notation is similar to attack tree 
notation [3], but is more appropriate for risk-benefit analyses and is widely supported 
by commercially available tools. Probability values are estimated, where needed, and 
then combined to compute a probability for the occurrence for an insecure or unsafe 
combination of conditions and events. Continuing the example from above, a fault 
tree analysis would assign a non-zero value to the likelihood of a dishonest manager 
receiving authorization.   
To perform model checking, the activity diagram can be converted to a state 
machine. Activities become states (of performing the activity). Precondition sets 
become the transition conditions to pass from one state to another. Initial values for 
literals appearing in the transition conditions must be set (to True, False, or Don’t 
know). Defense mechanisms included in the state machine change the values of 
literals when visited. 
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6 Discussion 
The closest approach to ours is clearly the one based on misuse cases [1], [7]. Misuse 
cases are not developed systematically and it is easy to miss important attacks. That 
approach also uses other use cases to mitigate or prevent attacks. Use cases are 
interactions of users with the system but attack prevention cannot be done in general 
through additional interactions. We need instead security policies and the 
corresponding mechanisms to implement them. Misuse cases because of their 
reliance on whole use cases they need to define new stereotypes such as “threaten” 
and “mitigate” use cases, while we just use standard use cases. We do not think that 
the emphasis on protecting assets is also the best for information systems. Emphasis 
on assets makes sense when we are talking of physical assets that can be stolen. 
Information security is about preventing illegal reading or modification of 
information as well as assuring its availability. It makes then more sense to defend 
against specific actions, e.g. stealing identity, instead of protecting the identity 
database. 
The group at the Open University in the U.K. has done a significant amount of 
work on security requirements [17], including the use of abuse frames to lead to 
security requirements (an abuse frame is similar to a misuse case but using Jackson’s 
problem frames [18].  
[2] discusses requirements for secure systems using the concept of goal-oriented 
requirements. Other authors also have focused on security requirements [5], [19] but 
none of them consider use cases. Mouratidis and his group use a special 
methodology, Tropos, to model security. Their approach to develop requirements 
does not consider use cases either [20].         
Van Lamsweerde considers anti-models, which describe how specifications of 
model elements could be maliciously threatened, why and by whom [21]. His 
approach combines ideas from misuse cases and goal-oriented requirements. 
All these models consider a coarser unit that can be attacked and are less 
systematic than our approach.  
7 A methodology to build secure systems 
This work is part of a methodology to build secure systems. Of course, it does not 
need to be applied as part of this approach but the methodology provides a context 
for our development. A main idea in the proposed methodology is that security 
principles should be applied at every stage of the software lifecycle and that each 
stage can be tested for compliance with security principles. Another basic idea is the 
use of patterns to guide security at each stage [9]. Figure 6 shows a secure software 
lifecycle, indicating where security can be applied (white arrows) and where we can 
audit for compliance with security principles and policies (dark arrows).  
 This project proposes guidelines for incorporating security from the 
requirements stage through analysis, design, implementation, testing, and 
deployment.  Our approach considers the following development stages: 
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Fig. 6. Secure software lifecycle 
Domain analysis stage: A business model is defined.  Legacy systems are 
identified and their security implications analyzed.  Domain and regulatory 
constraints are identified.  Policies must be defined up front, in this phase. The 
suitability of the development team is assessed, possibly leading to added training.  
Security issues of the developers, themselves, and their environment may also be 
considered in some cases.  This phase may be performed only once for each new 
domain or team.  
Requirements stage: Use cases define the required interactions with the system. 
Applying the principle that security must start from the highest levels, it makes sense 
to relate attacks to use cases. We study each action within a use case and see which 
threats are possible (this paper).   We then determine which policies would stop these 
attacks. From the use cases we can also determine the needed rights for each actor 
and thus apply a need-to-know policy.  Note that the set of all use cases defines all 
the uses of the system and from all the use cases we can determine all the rights for 
each actor. The security test cases for the complete system are also defined at this 
stage. 
Analysis stage: Analysis patterns can be used to build the conceptual model in a 
more reliable and efficient way. Security patterns describe security models or 
mechanisms. We can build a conceptual model where repeated applications of a 
security model pattern realize the rights determined from use cases. In fact, analysis 
patterns can be built with predefined authorizations according to the roles in their use 
cases. Then we only need to additionally specify the rights for those parts not 
covered by patterns. We can start defining mechanisms (countermeasures) to prevent 
attacks.  
Design stage: Design stage: when we have the possible attacks to a system, 
design mechanisms are selected to stop these attacks. User interfaces should 
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correspond to use cases and may be used to enforce the authorizations defined in the 
analysis stage. Secure interfaces enforce authorizations when users interact with the 
system. Components can be secured by using authorization rules for Java or .NET 
components. Distribution provides another dimension where security restrictions can 
be applied. Deployment diagrams can define secure configurations to be used by 
security administrators. A multilayer architecture is needed to enforce the security 
constraints defined at the application level. In each level we use patterns to represent 
appropriate security mechanisms. Security constraints must be mapped between 
levels.  
Implementation stage: This stage requires reflecting in the code the security rules 
defined in the design stage. Because these rules are expressed as classes, 
associations, and constraints, they can be implemented as classes in object-oriented 
languages. In this stage we can also select specific security packages or COTS, e.g., 
a firewall product, a cryptographic package. Some of the patterns identified earlier in 
the cycle can be replaced by COTS (these can be tested to see if they include a 
similar pattern).  
7 Conclusions 
We have presented an approach that produces all (or most) of the threats to a given 
application. This happens because we consider systematically all actions within a use 
case and we see how they could be subverted. While all this could be done in the 
textual version of the use case, the use of UML activity diagrams produces a clear 
and more intuitive way to analyze these attacks. From the threats we derive 
necessary policies to stop or mitigate them. 
We have now completed the requirements stage and we are ready to start 
defining the solution to our design problem. Each identified threat can be analyzed to 
see how it can be accomplished in the specific environment. The list can then be 
used to guide the design and to select security products. It can also be used to 
evaluate the final design by analyzing whether the system defenses can stop all these 
attacks. As we indicated earlier since use cases define all the interactions with the 
system we can find from them the rights needed by these roles to perform their work 
(need to know).  Future work will concentrate in the transition from the policies to 
the mechanisms. 
When dealing with a complex safety-critical software system, the number and 
complexity of threats will increase; for example, there may be more than one way to 
attack a particular action. Without proper mechanisms to represent this information, 
software developers will have difficulty to effectively digest the information and to 
validate the design and implementation. Another future work is to find a better way, 
considering layout, style etc, to document the misuse action diagrams, that can be 
effective even for complex systems. Some work has been done to assess the efficacy 
of UML diagrams as one type of graphical documentation [22], [23].  For example, 
we can use annotated UML activity diagrams and Interaction Overview Diagrams to 
assess the best way to document misuse actions, according to quality attributes such 
as completeness and effectiveness.  
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